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‘Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require rapid, far-reaching and 
unprecedented changes in all aspects of society.’ 
UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, October 2018 
 
‘This changes everything’1? Rethinking fragility and violent conflicts from the 
climate crisis perspective 
 
1. Introduction  
With reports of Arctic fires (e.g. Cockburn 2019) in the summer of 2019 and extreme 
heat waves and droughts in South Asia and Europe and flooding in the USA 
becoming more frequent and intense, and weekly worldwide climate demonstrations, 
we are reminded that climate change is very real, and political action has to be taken 
urgently.  
There is a great scientific consensus that climate change is to a large extent 
humanmade; i.e. that human activities have largely contributed to climate change 
(e.g. IPCC 2013; IPCC 2018; World Bank 2010). We know that if we do not cut 
carbon emissions and stop ecosystem and biodiversity destruction urgently and 
radically, catastrophic climate consequences are highly probable. Published 
estimates of the numbers of people who may be displaced by climate crisis-related 
effects by 2050 range from 25 million to 300 million people (e.g. Kälin 2010; 
Wilkinson et al. 2016). 
Countries at the highest risk of climate crisis are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa 
and South Asia. These countries in the global South will bear an estimated 75% of 
the costs of the climate crisis, while the poorest half of the world’s population cause 
just 10% of CO2 emissions (World Bank 2010). 
Given the urgency to act, some climate scientists and activists, such as the Extinction 
Rebellion movement, speak of a climate crisis or climate emergency.  
The challenges ahead are formidable. We argue that only by challenging current 
assumptions underpinning international donor policies and practices on fragility and 
conflict will we be able to meet the concrete challenges of the climate crisis. We are 
 
1 Title of Naomi Klein’s book (Klein 2015). 
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calling for nothing less radical than a paradigm shift. Business-as-usual or cosmetic 
changes will not do it now – if they ever did.  
We do not claim to be neutral or impartial bystanders in the context of the climate 
crisis: we are writing this article from the standpoint of practitioner-scholars from the 
global North who have worked for more than 20 years in the fields of international 
development, non-violent social change, conflict transformation and peacebuilding.2 
We position ourselves as supporters of the demands of climate justice movements 
including Fridays for Future,3 Extinction Rebellion4 and others. As international social 
change facilitators, we acknowledge that we most probably have a higher carbon 
footprint than most citizens in the global North – and certainly the South.   
Some argue5 that to frame the current situation as a crisis is problematic on the 
grounds that it can support eco-authoritarian action and a politics of despair that stifle 
hopeful action. We would argue the opposite. The current wave of international 
climate justice activism has motivated millions of people because hope and action 
can only come once people acknowledge a problem as an essential crisis, recognise 
its urgency and want to address it. People will never have hope when they see that 
little or no action is taken and that most people are ignoring the crisis. Our view is 
that while it is important to validate knowledge on both the extent and impact of 
climate change, 30 or more years of expert knowledge have not translated into the 
necessary action. If action is not taken now – while there is still the opportunity for 
democratically driven reform – then an unimaginably draconian response from 
governments will be inevitable.  
 
2 Danny Burns is a research professor at the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at the University 
of Sussex, UK. Dr Cordula Reimann has worked for more than 20 years as a consultant, trainer and 
senior lecturer and researcher on conflict transformation. Both have worked for more than 15 years on 
systems approaches to non-violent social change and conflict transformation. Danny has pioneered 
systems action research as a conflict transformation methodology in Mali and Myanmar.  
3 See: Fridays for Future 
4 Extinction Rebellion, founded in October 2018, in the UK has become an international climate 
movement, using non-violence and civil disobedience to raise awareness about the climate crisis and 
demand urgent political action. Its three demands to governments are: (1) to tell the truth about the 
climate and ecological crisis and to call for a climate emergency; (2) to act now to halt biodiversity loss 
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero by 2025; and (3) to create and be led by participatory 
democracy in the form of citizens’ assemblies. See: Extinction Rebellion.  
5 Including colleagues at IDS, University of Sussex, UK. 
  
   
 
5
We do not claim to have all the answers. This article maybe raises more questions 
than it is able to answer. Our aim is to provoke and to initiate deeper self-reflection 
among those working on fragility and violent conflicts.  
The paper is split into two main sections. The first discusses some of the main 
challenges resulting from the climate crisis for international and local practices and 
donor policies on fragility and violent conflicts. The second section highlights 
concrete implications of putting the climate crisis centre stage.  
We refer here to some of the key publications and use broad brushstrokes, without 
claiming to do justice to the complexity of multidisciplinary findings on climate 
research. Illustrative examples, data and case studies mentioned are largely drawn 
from published research and reports from research institutes, international 
government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and comprehensive 
databases of humanitarian crises and climate change.6  
 
2. Challenges from the climate crisis perspective  
There are many different challenges for practices and policies on the nexus of 
fragility and violent conflicts. We highlight the following four from a climate crisis 
perspective. 
First, the climate crisis threatens to undo the last 50 years of progress in 
(sustainable) development, poverty reduction, global health and human rights 
in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Effects of climate change, such as increased 
frequency and/or intensity of flooding, droughts or hurricanes will destroy the results 
and achievements of development processes literally overnight – be it physical 
infrastructure, the fight against epidemics, access to natural resources or 
transboundary water management. These climate impacts are asymmetric in the 
sense that those already most vulnerable will be the most affected (Byravan and 
Rajan 2010).  
The global South is and will be particularly affected as a result of geographic location; 
limited institutional infrastructure, capacity and resources; and serious shortages of 
 
6 Such as EDGAR, the Emergency Events Database (EMDAT) and databases provided by the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
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and deficiencies in food, water, sanitation and health care. As less privileged and 
poorer countries and members of society will be more directly affected by the climate 
crisis, the world will increasingly be at risk of ‘climate apartheid in which the wealthy 
pay to escape overheating, hunger, and conflict, while the rest of the world is left to 
suffer’ (UN Human Rights Council 2019).  
The most recent findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
– the United Nations body for assessing the science related to climate change – 
confirm these alarming facts and trends (IPCC 2018). 
Governments are a long way from keeping temperatures below the threshold agreed 
in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change7 – i.e. to limit global average temperature 
increase to 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue a target of 1.5°C. The pledges 
governments have made to reduce greenhouse gas emissions set us on a path to a 
3.2°C rise in average global temperature.8 Given this, the following scenarios are 
likely:  
• Falling crop yields, mainly in developing regions; 
• Sea level rises; 
• Species extinction; 
• Extreme weather events such as storms, forest fires, droughts, flooding and 
heat waves; and 
• Abrupt and large-scale shifts in the climate system, such as the weakening of 
natural carbon absorption and onset of irreversible melting of the Greenland 
and West Antarctic ice sheets.  
These scenarios justify to us the need to speak of a climate crisis or emergency.  
The European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) underlines this crisis 
scenario by stressing that: 
An increase of 1.5 degrees is the maximum the planet can tolerate; should 
temperatures increase further beyond 2030, we will face even more droughts, 
floods, extreme heat and poverty for hundreds of millions of people; the likely 
 
7 For the text of the Paris Agreement, see: Paris Agreement  
8 See: Climate Action Tracker  
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demise of the most vulnerable populations – and at worst, the extinction of 
humankind altogether (ESPAS 2019: 9) 
Many leading scientists might agree with the alarming statement that the ‘climate 
math is brutally clear: While the world can't be healed within the next few years, it 
may be fatally wounded by negligence until 2020’ (McGrath 2019b).9  
According to Philip Alston, the UN special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human 
rights, the impacts of global warming are likely to undermine not only basic rights to 
life, water, food and housing for hundreds of millions of people, but also democracy 
and the rule of law.  
Second, social conflicts and fragility risks will worsen or emerge as climate-related 
risks and challenges will be superimposed on pre-existing social and political 
dynamics. These include: 
• Social and political power inequalities, and social and political discrimination 
and exclusion of women, non-binary individuals, ethnic minorities, indigenous 
groups and underprivileged groups, such as modern-day slaves in India, 
Bangladesh and Nepal;  
• Infectious diseases such as cholera or Ebola and mental health risks, 
including the traumatic legacy of warfare and violence; 
• Current (intra- and inter-state) violent conflicts; 
• Unequal income, poverty and wealth stratification; 
• Population growth; and 
• Unequal access to natural resources. 
 
9 Quoting Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, founder and director emeritus of the Potsdam Climate Institute. 
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Figure 1 Interaction of social and political dynamics with climate change challenges.  
Credit: Cordula Reimann and Danny Burns 
 
The following climate-related, socioeconomic and environmental, risks and 
challenges stand out (see also adelphi et al. 2015):  
• Biodiversity loss; 
• Land degradation and deforestation; 
• Competition over local resources such as water, land, energy, oil and gas;  
• Transboundary water management; 
• Livelihood and food insecurity;10 
• Unsustainable patterns of economic growth, consumption and production;  
• Forced increases in migration and internal displacement; 
• Increased urbanisation with associated pressures on infrastructure; 
• Increased frequency and intensity of disasters such as hurricanes, droughts 
and floods; 
• Rising sea levels and coastal degradation; 
• Climate-insensitive peacebuilding and development interventions; 
• Negative, unintended effects of climate policies; and 
• Conflict-insensitive climate adaptation and mitigation policies.  
 
10 For an excellent visualisation of possible scenarios of food insecurity in the context of climate 
change and adaptation policies, see: The Met Office  
Climate-
related
risks & 
challenges 
Existing or 
new social, 
political & 
conflict 
dynamics 
  
   
 
9
Some of these risks are primary drivers of the current climate crisis, such as rising 
sea levels and global warming. Others, such as floods and the resulting internal 
displacement, constitute more secondary effects of the primary drivers.  
Some research (e.g. Burrows and Kinney 2016) and peacebuilding NGOs such as 
International Alert (e.g. Smith and Vivekananda 2007, 2009) have illustrated how 
climate change-related effects such as floods or droughts have led to increases in 
displacement and migration, and contributed to or further accelerated existing violent 
conflicts. Other examples from the literature illustrate similar dynamics (see Box 1). 
Box 1: Examples of the magnifying and multiplying effects of risks 
• Heavy flooding in Pakistan (2011–12) aggravated existing tensions between 
migrants and non-migrants, increased rural-urban migration and led to violent 
conflict over political power between migrants and non-migrants (Bhattacharyya 
and Werz 2012) 
 
• Since 2005, a serious drought and water scarcity in Western Sahara have led 
to an increase in labour-related migration of pastoralists, and contributed to 
clashes between pastoralists and farmers over resources (UNEP 2011; Nyong 
2011).  
 
• For more than 20 years, there have been serious droughts in Peru and Bolivia. 
Different analyses stress that these droughts have not only increased labour-
related migration of farmers; but also contributed to violent tensions and conflict 
among farmers on the one hand, and between farmers and indigenous 
migrants on the other (Hoffman and Grigera 2013; Kaenzig and Piguet 2014; 
Walker 2017). 
While the exact contribution of humanmade climate change to these events cannot 
be determined precisely, the magnifying effects of climate change are likely to 
increase dramatically.  
While these risks individually aggravate vulnerabilities of local communities, the 
interplay of the risks may have a potentially even more harmful effect on people’s 
vulnerabilities. For example, studies by Alam et al. (2015) and Pearl-Martinez (2012) 
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showed the disproportionate effects of climate change on women who lacked equal 
representation in formal decision-making and programme design. Other publications 
have focused on the gender-specific dimensions of climate change; e.g. looking at 
the effects on women of deforestation, climate-induced displacement and migration, 
and flooding (Least Developed Countries Expert Group 2015; Aguilar 2009). 
We do not understand the climate crisis as a single driving factor creating fragility, 
displacement, conflicts and violence – implying a deterministic and linear, cause-
effect pathway. Rather, we understand the climate crisis as a ‘risk multiplier’ or ‘risk 
catalyst’, creating vicious circles of risk and fragility as a result of multiple interrelated 
causalities. As every context is different, these multiple causalities will play out 
differently from region to region and country to country. The specific magnitude and 
impact of climate-related risks will be heavily dependent on government mitigation 
and adaptation policies, local resources and institutions, social and political 
grievances, and geographic location. In this context, one can read the more critical 
challenges to the idea of climate change as a risk multiplier, as in the case of the war 
in Syria (Selby et al. 2017).  
While on the one hand climate change can be seen as a risk catalyst, creating a 
vicious circle of tensions, risks and fragilities, on the other hand it has the potential to 
be turned into a virtuous circle of opportunities for collective resilience, cooperation 
and social cohesion among affected communities and regions (Smith and 
Vivekananda 2007: 8). Documentation and research on the Nile Basin Initiative have 
shown how water management governance and cooperation can lead to forms of 
mutual coexistence, and effective institutionalised conflict mitigation and resolution 
mechanisms across countries, boundaries and regions (e.g. Mason 2004; Motlagh 
2018). Focusing on how to enhance forms of cross-country and cross-boundary 
cooperation in the context of natural resource management has been the focus of 
environmental peacebuilding.11 Yet, given the sheer extent of short- and long-term 
effects of the climate crisis, the polarised position of international actors, and weak 
 
11 There is no single definition of environmental peacebuilding. Other terms used are peace ecology or 
environmental peacemaking. For a good overview of case studies and current discussions around 
climate change and peacebuilding, see: Environmental Peacebuilding. Environmental peacebuilding 
has been part of the UN’s agenda of peacebuilding since the mid-1990s and led to UNEP undertaking 
environmental assessments of violent conflict/war contexts (see, e.g. UNEP 2004; Carius 2006; Halle 
2009; Bruch et al. 2016). 
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national and international implementation of the Paris Agreement, these positive 
examples are few and far between.  
Third, the countries that most urgently require mitigation and adaptation 
strategies are usually in the weakest position to deliver them, and their peoples 
bear the least responsibility for the predicament they find themselves in. At the same 
time, there is little political appetite among governments in the global North to 
implement and enforce effective mitigation and adaptation strategies in their 
own countries, although have the resources and capacity to do so.  
According to estimates, the population living in extreme poverty in the global South 
could increase by 122 million by 2030 (Hallegatte et al. 2016: 9). Outbreaks of 
infectious diseases, including malaria and diarrhoea – e.g. through poor water and 
food quality and extreme weather events – are very likely (ibid.). Also, if a country or 
region has been affected by abject poverty, and/or violent conflicts and warfare for 
decades – as in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Mali or Pakistan – local and indigenous 
people might not see government climate crisis adaptation policies as a priority.  
This raises three questions:  
1. First, how can climate change adaptation policies address local realities, risks, 
vulnerabilities and tensions without further enhancing them? This speaks to 
the need for context- and conflict-sensitive implementation of adaptation 
policies. This seems even more relevant if climate change adaptation policies 
are going to dominate donor agendas at the expense of budget lines badly 
needed for poverty reduction and peacebuilding.  
 
2. Second, how can climate-change-related questions become an integral part of 
official peace processes and peace negotiations? 
 
3. Third, how should we respond to national climate adaptation policies that have 
become or constitute obstacles to peacebuilding processes and thereby a 
breeding ground for new tensions and violent conflicts? Or, to put it the other 
way around, how should we deal with climate change policies that aggravate 
existing social tensions or become a ‘carte blanche’ for human rights violations 
in disguise? 
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Box 2: Example of conflict-insensitive implementation of adaptation policies 
Bangladesh is one of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world, due to its 
topography – just a few metres above sea level, with many parts of the country 
regularly flooding. Its government has been hailed internationally for its UN-
financed and -supported climate change adaptation policies. However, the same 
government turned a blind eye to, ignored or legitimised unregulated settlement by 
Bengali settlers, deforestation and land grabbing by security forces and/or 
multinational companies in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), a natural habitat that 
was home to more than 50 indigenous communities. An estimated 400,000–
600,000 Bengali people settled in the CHT, where they cleared trees on steep 
hillsides and began farming, resulting in soil erosion and unsustainable livelihoods 
(Smith and Vivekananda 2007: 16).  
Apart from anything else, the example above stresses that technical climate change 
mitigation and adaptation approaches may be a necessary short-term measure, but 
are ineffective if they do not take into account social, political and climate-related 
realities on the ground. As Smith and Vivekananda stress ‘technical fixes will only act 
as sticking plasters’ (2009: 14). 
Comparatively speaking, little has been documented or written on the unintended, 
negative or positive effects of climate mitigation and adaptation practices and policies 
on peacebuilding efforts. An illustrative example may here be the ways in which 
large-scale biofuel production – hailed as an alternative to fossil fuels – have affected 
poor farmers’ and indigenous peoples’ access to land, leading to increases in food 
prices and inter-communal violence (Oxfam 2008).  
International donors, NGOs and agencies have the power to influence the political 
and socio-political context by ensuring that support for local stakeholders – be they 
community-based organisations, NGOs, political elites or institutions – is climate-
sensitive and conflict-sensitive; i.e. by ensuring their projects, programmes or 
activities do not (unintentionally) provoke climate-related risks such as increased 
environmental degradation, loss of biodiversity and livelihoods, and food insecurity, 
while at the same time taking into account whether existing social tensions and 
conflicts are (unintentionally) aggravated.  
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Fourth, in the past five to ten years, we can observe an increased trend toward 
‘securitization’ of climate change (see Scott 2012). This begs the question of who 
has the power of definition and who has not to call a risk or effect a ‘security threat’. 
Without going into speculative scenarios, there is a real danger that powerful 
permanent members of the UN Security Council will engage in a militarised climate 
change adaptation strategy: they will use ‘climate change issues’ in affected 
countries to legitimise military intervention in ‘fragile states’ – to support like-minded 
national governments under the guise of countering ‘threats to stability and peace’ 
and ‘climate justice’. Along these lines, some commentators go so far to say that: 
(w)hen the military and security forces are the strongest and best-funded 
institutions in our society, we can’t be surprised when they become the default 
institutions for dealing with climate change impacts (Buxton 2018). 
What is striking in the climate and security nexus is that little attention has been 
drawn in either public or academic discourses to the military as a key actor and its 
role in enforcing a corporate-dominated fossil-fuel economy. Some may argue that 
this is another expression of the power of the military-industrial-complex. The role of 
the army in climate crisis will be further discussed in the next section.  
We have highlighted here four different but related challenges for those working on 
fragility and violent conflicts from a climate crisis perspective, while emphasising that 
the climate crisis is best understood as a fragility and risks magnifier and catalyst, 
most likely creating vicious circles of vulnerabilities as a result of multiple interrelated 
causalities.   
‘We cannot be radical enough in dealing with this issue.’ 
David Attenborough, July 2019 
3. What are we waiting for? What needs to be done? 
While the facts and trends climate scientists and the IPCC have put forward in 
relation to climate crisis are clear and straightforward, some people are waiting for 
science to give us an exact picture of future scenarios before they act. But this will 
never be possible because we are dealing with multi-causal dynamics of factors and 
impacts. This is especially true in the context of social tensions and violent conflict 
dynamics worldwide. Unexpected but plausible large-scale shock events such as 
nuclear war could drastically affect any scenario.  
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This implies at least three things:  
1. First, gaps in evidence and knowledge should not be an excuse for political, 
organisational, professional or personal inaction or ignorance. We need to 
encourage a common-sense assessment of risk. If our house is burning down, 
our first reaction is not normally to seek academic evidence on the chances that it 
may or not be burned to a cinder. We simply act to put it out. In the same vein, we 
do not try to prevent firefighters from entering the house and putting out the fire. 
The fact that the vast majority of climate change scientists agree there is a 
climate and ecological crisis should prompt us to act. Given the dramatic and 
irrevocable consequences of climate change on our planet, it is common sense to 
take a low-risk approach, rather than stick our heads in the sand and hope that 
the outcomes will not be as bad as everyone is saying.  
 
2. Second, as practitioners, individuals and organisations, we have to learn to deal 
with high degrees of uncertainty next to complexity, chaos and contradictions – 
some of us more than others. As Smith and Vinekanada put it: ‘In development 
and peacebuilding in the face of climate change, it is perhaps better to be vaguely 
right than to risk being precisely wrong’ (2009: 24). This would suggest that we, 
as professionals in the fields of expertise and practice, have to become much 
better at scenario building. Thinking outside the box needs to become the norm 
and not the organisational exception. A possible consequence could be that 
institutions and agencies in development and peacebuilding become more 
flexible, better at systemic and experiential learning, knowledge sharing and 
learning to adjust as they go along (Tanner et al. 2013). Thinking about these 
issues though a ‘logframe mindset’ will not help us to understand the complexity 
of the non-linear climate change-related risks in the context of development and 
peacebuilding.  
 
3. Third, the impacts of the climate crisis urge an end to institutional and disciplinary 
‘silo thinking’. When we think of climate-related risks such as deforestation, 
drought or flooding, it quickly becomes clear that these interrelated risks and 
challenges need inter-sectoral analysis and solutions. 
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Given what we know about the climate crisis, what are the implications? We highlight 
the following, some of which are clearly more controversial than others.  
At a minimum, ‘better than nothing’ donor strategies must immediately focus on 
implementing the Paris Agreement. Concretely and practically, this means all 
development and peacebuilding projects and programmes should undertake climate 
change impact assessments to analyse how a given project can mitigate or minimise 
potential harmful climate-related effects and maximise climate-friendly effects. How 
we design a project and programme in a way that supports local connectors and 
weakens dividers is central to so-called DnH (Do no Harm) methodology.12 Looking 
at how DnH has been used by different development and peacebuilding actors, one 
could argue that the impacts of climate change (e.g. higher intensity and/or frequency 
of flooding or droughts) are often raised as important features of the conflict context 
without necessarily being labelled climate-related or -specific.  
Given that many donors, agencies and NGOs aim to work with conflict-sensitive 
assessments such as the DnH methodology, peace and conflict impact assessments 
or peace and conflict assessments, it would not be necessary to reinvent the wheel 
but rather build on existing methodologies and frameworks and adjust them 
accordingly. Conflict transformation and peacebuilding projects and processes 
should be ‘climate proofed’ (Smith and Vivekananda 2009); that is, they should 
include climate-specific challenges and risks as part of the (post-) conflict context and 
build them into the peacebuilding design, project or process.  
This is not easy to achieve. Smith and Vivekanda (2009: 17) offer an illustrative 
example of what they consider to be climate-proofed reintegration of ex-combatants 
in Liberia: reintegrating ex-combatants usually means socially and economically 
reintegrating them into society by allowing them to earn a living in their place of 
origin. For many of them, that means going back to rural areas and earning a living 
as a farmer. Given that projected climate change effects for Liberia mean crop yields 
may halve, with bleak prospects for traditional farming, Smith and Vivekanda propose 
that the climate-sensitive way to go is to introduce new farming techniques and 
 
12 The current international and local practices of donors, agencies, international and local NGOs may 
suggest this methodology is used in multiple ways (e.g. safeguarding criteria, check lists for activities, 
staff recruitment, conflict-sensitive project and programme design). 
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alternative crop selection, and shift from crops to animal husbandry. By doing this, 
former fighters could become accepted members of the community instead of ending 
as resentful, unemployed farmers, and potential recruits for armed groups or militias 
(ibid.). However, one might argue that this could also be problematic and only of 
short-term benefit: new farming techniques might depend on chemical fertilisers that 
deplete the soil; alternative crop selection can lead to monocropping, which reduces 
bio-diversity and increases dependence on one crop; and animal production is less 
carbon friendly.  
Despite the challenges in managing these trade-offs, we would stress that 
developing user-friendly climate change impact assessments should be a priority for 
donors and peacebuilding organisations to mitigate the most obvious harm. 
Additionally, we suggest context- and conflict-sensitive assessments of existing 
international and national climate change adaptation policies. This is based on the 
earlier understanding and discussion that adaptation can aggravate existing social 
tensions, vulnerabilities and conflicts.  
Conflict- and context-sensitive climate change adaptation policies are badly needed. 
However, given the current extent of the climate crisis, we argue that to limit the 
worst and immediate harm to the climate, this minimum level of action will not do. 
Instead, transformative policies should be promoted that challenge the very practice 
of doing development and peacebuilding (Godfrey-Wood and Naess 2016) by 
focusing on:  
• Challenging the growth delusion; and 
• Challenging the military-industrial complex. 
At the same time, we would like to highlight one important locus for making change 
happen:  
• Supporting collective resilience and resistance.  
Some dimensions of these three areas echo the long-standing demands of (national 
and international) climate justice and human rights movements and indigenous 
communities in the global North and South. 
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4. Challenging the growth delusion  
While this is not the occasion to discuss the political economy of development and 
(international) peacebuilding (e.g. Distler et al. 2018; Gonzalez-Vicente 2018; Pugh 
2005), much development and peacebuilding practice – supported by UN and other 
international and national agencies and donors – is based on uncontested principles 
of ‘market integration or liberalisation’, or what some scholars call ‘market 
democracy’. This market liberalisation is based on the overriding idea of markets’ 
capacity to deliver prosperity and development. It comes in the form of external – or 
externally dictated – economic (re)construction of social infrastructure and 
democratic institutions in poverty-ridden and war-torn societies. 
The impacts of the climate crisis challenge the socioeconomic foundation of 
international peacebuilding and development – i.e. neoliberal models based on 
perpetual economic growth (Godfrey-Wood and Naess 2016; Maxton 2019). It 
confronts us with the dramatic and harmful effects of consumption and production in 
the global North and by elites in the global South.13 
The global economy is driven by the growth imperative of large multinational 
corporations to maximise profits. If we take up the argument of Klein (2015) that the 
climate crisis ‘changes everything’ and critically challenges economic growth in the 
form of neoliberal capitalism, what does this mean for our understanding of economic 
growth underpinning development and peacebuilding practices? 
In 2009, UNEP called for a Global Green New Deal (GGND) as a policy response to 
an international financial and economic crisis. The idea of the GGND was to revive 
the global economy and boost employment, while at the same time addressing 
climate change, environmental degradation and poverty. To this end, the GGND 
called on all governments to focus on economic recovery, poverty eradication, and 
reduced carbon emissions and ecosystem degradation. The GGND proposed a 
framework for green stimulus programmes, as well as supportive domestic and 
international policies (UNEMG 2011; Barbier 2010). Calls for ‘green economy 
models’ and ‘green stimulus packages’ have gained more international attention over 
 
13 Scholars such as Lewton (2019) argue that the climate crisis shows us the limits of conventional 
development as professional practice and ideology.  
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the past ten years, although they have been on the table for some time, reflected in 
initiatives such as the UNCED declaration in Rio in 199214 or Agenda 21.15  
While the GGND made reducing carbon dependency and developing renewable 
energy a top item on the policy agenda and in relation to climate change adaptation, 
Edward Barbier – a US economist and architect of the GGND – stresses that little 
additional support for the green transition has materialised in any country (Barbier 
2019). Barbier offers important lessons from the GGND initiative in the light of calls 
for a ‘Green New Deal’ in the context of US policymaking, such as complementary 
pricing reforms to transition to green energy, including phasing out fossil fuel 
subsidies and taxing carbon (ibid.).  
The policy discussions around the Green New Deal and the GGND should also 
facilitate a much-needed public and policy debate on the elephant in the room; 
namely, what kind of economic development we are aiming for in the context of the 
climate crisis. Are we subscribing to a big – albeit greener – ‘growth delusion’ (Pilling 
2018)?  
One could argue that the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) do not 
challenge the growth delusion but take it more as an unchallenged and unquestioned 
policy prerogative, which should inform sustainable development and peacebuilding 
processes and practices.  
Most governments measure and read the economic development performance and 
social wellbeing of their citizens in the form of gross domestic product (GDP). From 
the GDP perspective, bigger and more are always better, whereas the effects of 
climate crisis show us the clear boundaries of and challenges to this logic. The 
economic benefits of increased GDP in any case overwhelmingly benefit the growing 
number of rich people, radically increasing the gap between rich and poor – a 
process which is strongly in evidence in countries such as Brazil, India and Nigeria.  
This means that as large companies reap the rewards, international NGOs and 
development agencies have to pay the costs. Some commentators have argued for 
inclusive growth strategies and this is explicit in the compromise the SDGs represent. 
 
14 See: United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Earth Summit  
15 See: Agenda 21, UN  
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Inclusive growth, however, still almost exclusively measures growth financially. 
Growth needs to be measured in relation to carbon emissions. The necessary move 
towards zero carbon emissions – not just their reduction – will require a complete 
redefinition of global international development imperatives. 
While discussing the economic and analytical shortcomings – and benefits – of GDP 
as a measurement of economic development is beyond the scope of this article and 
has been done elsewhere (e.g. Pilling 2018; Stiglitz 2019), it raises important 
questions about policy priorities and the underlying fundamental understanding of 
wealth, a ‘good life’, and the wellbeing of citizens in relatively peaceful and violence-
torn societies. Indeed, government policies will need to go hand in hand with 
consumer demands, and this requires articulating the necessary changes as 
sustainable, positive and life-affirming alternatives rather than as a reduction in living 
standards. 
Challenges to the economic growth models are anything but new. The Club of Rome 
with its 1972 Limits to Growth report raised critical questions over our potentially 
harmful and damaging use of the planet earth’s limited and finite natural resources 
(Meadows et al. 1972).  
In 2012, the UN started promoting other measures of economic growth at the UN 
High Level Meeting on ‘Happiness and Well-Being: Defining a New Economic 
Paradigm’.16 The UN introduced the World Happiness Index and the UN Sustainable 
Development Solutions Network has published the Word Happiness Report annually 
since 2012. The report documents and ranks 156 countries by how happy their 
citizens perceive themselves to be (Helliwell et al. 2019). The indicators or factors 
that are measured are GDP per capita, health, life expectancy, social support, 
freedom to make life choices, generosity and corruption perception. Questions of 
environmental protection and climate justice have so far not been taken into account.  
Bhutan was the first country to put wellbeing and environmental protection over 
economic growth by introducing the idea of gross national happiness (GNH) as the 
main philosophy of the country and the government.17 Since 2008, GNH has been 
 
16 See: Defining a New Economic Paradigm, UN 2012  
17 See: www.grossnationalhappiness.com  
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enshrined in the country’s constitution. In late May 2019, the government of New 
Zealand introduced the Wellbeing Budget (New Zealand Treasury 2019), as GDP 
alone would not guarantee the improvement of living standards, and would capture 
who benefits and who is left behind (Sigal 2019; Dickenson 2019). Both Bhutan and 
New Zealand prioritise questions of wellbeing and health alongside those of 
environmental protection and sustainable and equitable socioeconomic development. 
New Zealand’s wellbeing budget identifies two wellbeing goals that seem particularly 
relevant: moving to a low carbon emission economy and supporting indigenous 
communities (New Zealand Treasury 2019). 
From a sustainability perspective, growth economies create a range of unintended 
consequences that are increasingly playing into the mix of social inequality amplified 
by climate change. For example, creating a landscape in which small-scale 
subsistence agriculture is no longer viable is a driver of migration from agricultural 
areas, which is leading to larger and larger urban conurbations. These are 
increasingly likely to be unsustainable, raising questions such as how food supplies 
can reach urban populations – even if they can be generated – without increasing 
investments in road transport, plastic packaging, refrigeration and so on. There is an 
almost unquestioned assumption that urbanisation is irreversible. What is needed is 
radical thinking that focuses on how the benefits of urbanisation can be brought to 
more sustainable urban units, served by more localised agricultural systems.  
These initiatives prompt important questions for development and peacebuilding:  
• Focus on well-being not economic growth – What are the lessons from 
New Zealand and Bhutan? How could discussions around the UN’s World 
Happiness Index be used to inform emerging debates on reshaping our 
understanding of wellbeing, sustainable development and climate justice? 
How could ideas and concepts from the global South and indigenous 
populations that put wellbeing and environmental protection centre stage more 
strongly inform international and public and policy debates about sustainable 
development, peacebuilding and climate change adaptation?  
• Take radical action to regulate and enforce the reduction of CO2 
emissions – What follows from a radical shift away from growth is that greater 
attention will need to be paid in both national and international law to 
regulating private sector practice. This suggests a much stronger role for the 
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state and international governance at a time when national democracy and 
international governance are under increasing threat. It requires a balancing 
act, in which citizens who challenge the state’s inaction on climate change, do 
not undermine it in such a way as to prevent it from regulating large 
corporations.  
• Eliminate contradictory policies which undermine efforts to tackle the 
climate crisis – Governments and donor policies need to be unequivocal in 
their response to human-induced climate change. They can no longer on the 
one hand support large-scale agri-businesses and on the other ecological 
alternatives such as permaculture. They can no longer encourage renewable 
energy resources while at the same time investing in fossil fuel development in 
countries such as in Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania. As we discuss in the 
following section, they can no longer continue to sell arms while claiming to 
tackle the climate crisis.  
 
5. Challenging the military-industrial complex 
In 2015, a report commissioned by the G7 countries for the G7 summit titled ‘A New 
Climate for Peace. Taking Action on Climate and Fragility Risks’ recommended 
‘[making] climate-fragility risks a central foreign policy priority’ (adelphi et al. 2015: 
13). Foreign policy is heavily influenced by the military-industrial complex in any 
country. The military, arms industry and multinational companies driving the military-
industrial complex have a major impact on carbon-driven growth, but they are often 
ignored in policymaking.   
While the USA is considered the world’s single-largest consumer of oil and top 
greenhouse gas emitter (Crawford 2019), there is no clear information on the extent 
of the climate impacts of the entire military and security sector. According to different 
estimates, the USA’s military engagement in the 2003–07 Iraq War generated more 
than three million metric tons of CO2 pollution per month (Smith 2016; Crawford 
2019). 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the history of military emissions 
and climate impacts and discuss why they have not been placed at the centre of 
international climate change negotiations, one can safely assume that the level of 
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emissions put forward by the Emissions Gap Report (UNEP 2018) and recent reports 
by the IPCC (IPCC 2018, 2019) would almost certainly be much higher if military 
emissions were included. The automatic exclusion of greenhouse gas emissions 
from military action was removed in the 2015 Paris Agreement. The administration of 
President Donald Trump refused to sign the agreement, and it is not mandatory for 
signatory countries to track and reduce their military carbon emissions.  
While military and security forces have started to improve their use of green, 
sustainable energy, critical voices consider this to be mainly ‘greenwashing’, a form 
of environmental marketing (Harris 2015). Commentators in the USA (Light 2014a, 
2014b) see the military as having the potential to be a key change-maker. They 
argue that by linking climate change with national security risks, the military could be 
seen as an ‘unequivocal validator of climate science’ (Light 2014a: 1799) and in a 
position to influence individuals’ attitudes, beliefs and behaviour on climate change, 
and thereby their use of fossil fuels and renewable energy.  
Whether the US military – or for that matter any military – is the best institution to 
influence society’s values and belief systems about climate change is debatable, not 
least because the current US president and commander-in-chief is an open ‘climate 
denier’. Furthermore, Light’s concept of the ‘military-environmentalist complex’ leaves 
the military logic unchallenged and uncontested: illegal arms trading and war-making 
are accepted forms of defence and foreign policy, and modern warfare is not possible 
without the profligate use of fossil fuels. By accepting the greenwashing of the 
military, we legitimise a ‘new’ military growth doctrine that justifies increased arms 
production and associated global risks.  
As Buxton (2018) and Buxton and Hayes (2015) remind us, to understand the current 
power of the military-industrial complex, one must understand that the arms industry 
does more than sell weapons: it offers ‘security solutions’ against terrorism, illegal 
immigration, smuggling, natural disasters and cyber fraud. The Homeland Security 
industry in the USA has paved the way for this all-encompassing security concept. 
According to market research, the industry will be worth US$418 billion by 2022.18 
According to SIPRI (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), military 
 
18 See: Allied Market Research, Homeland Security  
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spending is at an all-time high, reaching US$1,739 billion in 2017, equivalent to 
US$230 for every person on earth.19 
Reducing military CO2 emissions must urgently be put be on the agenda of climate 
change adaptation policies, which must go hand in hand with demilitarisation and 
disarmament. As the International Peace Bureau stressed in its most recent report, 
‘without the demilitarization of the economy, deep decarbonization cannot be 
achieved’ (Lorincz 2014: 9).  
According to the CDP Carbon Majors Report 2017, published by NGO CDP 
Worldwide, just 100 multinational companies are responsible for 71 per cent of global 
emissions (CDP Worldwide 2017). More than 50 per cent of global industrial 
emissions since 1988 can be traced back to 25 corporate and state-owned entities. 
The most recent update and research by the Climate Accountability Institute in 
October 2019 confirmed that 20 fossil fuel companies have contributed to 35 per cent 
of all energy-related CO2 and methane emissions  worldwide.20 They range from 
investor-owned firms – household names such as ExxonMobil, BP and Shell – to 
state-owned companies – including Saudi Aramco and Gazprom. Other critical actors 
in the military-industrial complex and an equally carbon-intensive and 
environmentally destructive sector are the multinational mining companies, which 
often pay lip service to or ignore international jurisdiction and regulation on climate 
change adaptation. 
The implications for development and peacebuilding as professional fields are the 
following: 
• Climate change research and negotiations must include military and 
multinational companies’ emissions in analysis, reporting and 
policymaking. 
• Climate change adaptation and mitigation policies must go hand in hand 
with disarmament – one cannot be meaningfully achieved without the other.  
 
19 See: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Global military spending remains high at 
$1.7 trillion  
20 See: Climate Accountability Institute  
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• Support is needed for action research, innovation and activism that 
challenge the military-industrial complex and promote non-violence, climate 
justice and disarmament.  
• Investment in innovative green start-ups and businesses that promote or 
have a track record in renewable energy, deep decarbonisation or sustainable 
development, and contribute to and enhance peaceful relations should be 
accelerated and their scale-up supported. Much research along those lines 
has already been undertaken by initiatives such as the Deep Decarbonization 
Pathways Project,21 which consists of scientific research teams from leading 
research institutions in 16 of the world’s largest greenhouse gas-emitting 
countries.22 
• Climate-specific accountability and regulatory mechanisms for 
transnational companies need to be developed alongside conflict-sensitive 
and climate-related impact assessments of existing trade and investment 
agreements, which drive transnational corporations’ practices. 
 
6. Supporting collective resilience and resistance  
All questions around climate justice and climate change adaptation raise issues of 
local ownership, social change and collective resilience. While we are aware that ‘the 
local’ is not by definition always good – or more effective than national or 
international actors and policies – sustainable solutions will be highly dependent on 
local knowledge, power and ownership.  
Looking at the long history of environmental protection and climate justice, one finds 
that a particular set of actors stand out: indigenous communities, urban poor, farmers 
and pastoralists. They are highly dependent on their lands for their livelihoods, and 
are typically either very directly affected by climate change and/or have a deep 
spiritual relationship with their traditional lands. Indigenous populations are 
endangered and their immediate livelihoods threatened when rainforests are 
 
21 For more information, see: Deep Carbonization Pathways Project  
22 Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, 
South Korea, the United Kingdom and USA. 
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destroyed (as is currently happening in the Amazon in Brazil). At the same time, 
indigenous climate activists have been exposed to gross human rights violations, 
including being killed or tortured for standing up for environmental protection and 
land rights, and against land grabbing. Female activists have disproportionately faced 
gender-based and sexualised violence such as rape. Activists from Brazil, Colombia, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guatemala, India, Mexico and the Philippines 
engaged in environmental protection, who criticise the malpractice of governments 
and companies in sectors such as mining and extractives, agribusinesses, water and 
dams, and logging are in great danger of prosecution, intimidation, human rights 
violations and murder (Global Witness 2019). 
Farmers cannot cultivate their lands if the soil is barren and infertile due to drought. 
As a result, there has been an alarming increase in serious mental health disorders 
such as depression, alcohol abuse and suicide among indigenous people and 
farmers in many countries heavily affected by the impacts of climate change; e.g. in 
India (Carleton 2017) or the case of the indigenous people living in the circumpolar 
North (Willox et al. 2015).   
Over the past decades, and as mentioned earlier, NGOs, agencies and research 
institutes have documented the climate-sensitive development practices and 
peacebuilding initiatives of indigenous communities, farmers, pastoralists and the 
urban poor (Bahadur and Tanner 2014). What many of these local initiatives have in 
common is that they strengthen planning strategies for adaptation to climate change, 
as they draw on existing grassroots governance mechanisms and support inter-
generational knowledge systems, integrating local and inter-generational knowledge 
to define patterns of vulnerability (see, e.g. the case study of the urban poor in 
Bangladesh in Johnson et al. 2019). 
There are also good working examples of how local communities have used 
participatory research – action research, in particular – to develop an understanding 
of the local drivers of climate change impacts and meaningful responses to climate 
change. Tanner and Seballos (2012) offer examples of how children were able to 
generate responses to disasters and climate change through action research. 
Similarly, Harvey et al. (2012) show how the Ghana Community Radio Network build 
their programming on climate change around an extended participatory process of 
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systemic action research. Radio station activists facilitated community inquiries into 
issues, then created complex system maps to understand the complex causalities 
and drivers that explained how climate change directly and indirectly affected 
communities. One of the most interesting aspects of this work was how it surfaced 
the ways in which local vested interests and power holders were radically 
exacerbating very local impacts of climate change. It became clear, for example, how 
critical land tenure was to the issue of coastal erosion, as were plans to develop the 
coastal area for tourism. They turned this knowledge into radio programmes, which 
were then broadcast to a wide audience. Working through community radio stations, 
which had high levels of trust among local communities and wide coverage, meant 
that meaningful participatory processes could operate at scale.  
If we believe that local communities know what is best for them when it comes to 
(non-violent) social change and climate change mitigation and adaptation, then it is 
critical for communities to make meaningful choices to help mitigate the impacts of 
climate change and develop innovative solutions to it.  
Empirical evidence from different parts of the world underlines that participatory and 
inclusive climate change adaptation processes are well positioned and suited for 
building resilient communities, as they give marginalised groups the opportunity to 
voice their concerns, and promote social cohesion and inter-group inclusion 
(Rahman and Hickey 2016; Smith and Vivekananda 2007).  
Resistance to participatory approaches is likely from those who have vested interests 
in the current status quo and inequalities. In fact, resistance might breed new socio-
political conflicts. Peacebuilders have a role to play in including actors and 
stakeholders such as potential ‘troublemakers’, ‘spoilers’ and the so-called ‘hard to 
reach’, such as multinational companies and armed groups. But peacebuilding 
organisations will be limited in their ability to shift those with vested economic 
interests in control and power who are engaged in, for example, land grabbing and 
land deforestation. In this context, it is vital to support local political resistance and 
global climate justice movements. This will put pressure on donors and governments 
alike to take a principled political approach to climate justice.  
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Some of the most important implications for development and peacebuilding are: 
• A radical shift away from the ‘projectisation’ of funding and social 
change is required – Grassroots and social movements know best what 
works in their cultural and climate-affected contexts. Donors should be willing 
to stop funding single and short-term climate change adaptation projects and 
invest instead in grassroots, local and regional movements for social change 
and climate justice.  
• Focus on the local – Donors should finance extensive localised, participatory 
climate change mitigation and adaptation processes. 
• Protection provisions for climate justice activists – Governments and 
donors should adopt a zero-tolerance policy on intimidation and violence 
against climate justice defenders (as discussed earlier).  
 
7. Conclusions 
This article has argued that the climate crisis ‘changes everything’ in so far as it 
demands a change in practice and in government and donor policies on fragility and 
violent conflicts. While a few peacebuilding organisations have been challenging the 
military-industrial complex and supporting collective resistance and resilience for 
many years, the climate crisis makes this work imperative and requires it to be 
politically mainstreamed. Challenging the growth delusion has to be understood as 
an overarching challenge for government, donor, and NGO practices and policies, as 
it radically questions our own lifestyles and consumer patterns.  
We can carry on with business as usual, pretending that the growth economy and the 
military-industrial complex are doing no harm. But this is not the truth. The first 
demand of Extinction Rebellion is to ‘tell the truth’. It is only once we collectively tell 
the truth and align ourselves with indigenous communities and international social 
movements, that we will be able to transform the systems which perpetuate climate 
injustice. 
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